Every religion is a product of human evolution and has been conditioned by social environment Since man has developed from a state even lower than savagery and was once intellectually a mere animal, it is reasonable to attribute to him in that state no more religious consciousness than is possessed by an animal. What then, the historian must ask, are the factors and what the means whereby humanity has encased itself in this shell of religion, which almost everywhere has been raised as a protective growth about the social body?
The simplest answer to this question has been that man is not a mere animal but differs from the beast in having an imm ortal soul and a religious instinct The argument is as follows : Assuming that there are no races which can be shown to be utterly devoid of religion, this element of human thought, because it is universal, we must consider as essential; hence, being essential, belief in a soul and in spiritual life is part of human nature; based on this natural conviction religion is the product of man’s religious instinct.
But the historian may assume neither the universality of religion (for there are human groups which make this an assumption of doubtful validity) nor the existence of a soul, because even the “religious instinct” does not require this assumption. Therefore the instinct itself cannot be assumed. Nor is such an instinct probable. Children have no religious ideas or impressions. Personally, the investigator may or may not believe in God, [ p. 2 ] soul, and a future life; but bis task is merely to show how belief in these and other components of religion arose and he can do this only by arranging in orderly progression all available data.
If is inevitable, however, that this study embrace man in the past as well as in the present and the psychological processes of prehistorical man cannot be known. Thus, heavily handicapped, the historian is liable to fall into one of two errors, either assuming that primordial man was the counterpart of what is now called primitive or arguing that, as man was at first pre-logical, he was then quite outside of our present comprehension. Moreover, even what is usually called primitive is often clearly unprimitive. For example, the EedsMn (Amerind) as compared with the Negro or Australian is far from being a primitive savage, Then there is sometimes the question whether an apparently primitive group has not relapsed from a higher state.
Nevertheless, a modicum of safety lies in the recognition of danger and the historian is generally justified in treating low forms of religion like low forms of art as comparatively primitive and in arguing that the lowest forms of religion as fotmd among savages today probably reflect the forms of religion known to such savages as existed in remote antiquity.
Theories to account for the origin and explain the growth of religion are numerous. Orthodoxy maintained in ancient India that there was one inspired religion and all other religions were decadent forms of it, while in the sixth century B. 0. heterodox Hindus said that all religions were invented by the priests for their own profit. The same theories sprang up independently centuries later in Europe. It is sufficient to say of these and similar theories that they were crude but probably honest guesses based on inadequate information. In the imme [ p. 3 ] diate past sundry theories have arisen based on a vrider survey and deeper knowledge. They alone demand attention at present, since they are founded on an immense number of careful observations and are upheld by different schools of capable investigators.
The first which is still held by many sociologists, is that connected with the names of Sir Edward Tylor and Herbert Spencer. It is usually called animism and is based on these facts and inductions. The savage believes that what is active is alive and that, being alive, an object, animal or material, has within it the same sort of spirit which man recognizes in himself. Hence he peoples the world with spirit-inhabited objects. He thinks also that, when he dreams, his spirit is abroad performing the acts which he imagines himself as doing in his dreams. Hence he acquires the notion of a spirit independent of the body and attributes to other men, animals, and objects a spirit and spiritual powers similar to his own. Again, as he sees in dreams a dead man apparently still active, he infers that the spirit of the dead still lives and that he himself when dead will still live, as wiU his animals and weapons. Because still living spirits may be malicious, the savage placates these potential foes; hence offerings to ghosts. Ghostly spirits are gradually endowed with more superhuman power and are then revered as gods.
The chief objections to this theory are, first, that the most primitive savage does not possess so clear an idea of spirit in distinction from body as is here implied; seoond, that the argument does not account in a satisfactory manner for undoubted cases of direct worship of natural phenomena; third, that if the theory were true, one would expect to find a universal cult of ghosts, which is by no means the case.
The second theory, called naturalism, with which is [ p. 4 ] generally connected tile name of Max Muller, but wMeh is rddely held by other German scholars — it might almost be called the German theory as contrasted with English animism — is based on the tendency of savages to fear and revere objects of nature that seem to them powerful, such as a waterfall or thunderstorm or majestic tree, to all of which they attribute life and anthropopathic nature. In like manner they revere venerable human phenomena, kings and wizards, and they people the sky with imagined kings and wizards as gods of natural phenomena, with underlings, as on earth. Man instinctively regards the sun as a great personage and the moon and stars as mother and children, or as shepherd and sheep. Man personifies all objects of nature and reveres what is awesome.
The chief objections to this theory are that it assumes in the savage a too pronounced tendency toward personification and that it ignores animism altogether or holds that a belief in spirits is secondary and negligible; man’s attitude toward natural phenomena is made the base of all religion. Owing to instances cited by Muller of misimderstanding of myths by later generations, leading to perverted religious views, this has been described as the theory holding that religion arises from a disease of language; but this is incorrect, since the question of language is not vital to the tneory.
A theory that “religion is the child of magic” has been developed by Sir J. G. Frazer, whose formula is explained on the supposition that man first tries to control nature by magical means and finding this impossible resorts to entreaty, which is the hall-mark of religion as distinguished from magic. But this is no explanation of the principles of religion, since magic itself is largely religious. In fact, there is a good deal to be said for the objection urged by Durkheim, to the effect that magic is [ p. 5 ] the child of religion rather than that religion is the child of magic.
Durkheim’s own theory, which is in general the French theory, has no formal designation but may be called collectivism, though illusionism would be a fitting naind for it. It assumes totemism as the earliest form of religion, holds incidentally that the totem-name comes from some convenient animal living near by, and builds up all religious data on the distinction between the tabooed, or sacra, and the common. The collective representation of a human group in regard to taboo things is religious belief, and this belief as to the sacred power or totemic force acts as a moral power. The totem is the symbol of the group as well as of the totemic force, a power which becomes the god’ of the community. Since it is at once the symbol of the society and of the god, the god and the society must be one and the same. The god is in fact the clan personified. As all religions, having a totemic origin, pass through the same phases, it follows that God and society are identical. All religious rites are social in origin and exhibit rules of conduct as to sacred things. Collective representation in regard to a mass of sacred things leads to the supposed existence of a world of sacred things and of extraordinary powers. Since collective representation is produced in the main by social excitement it follows that religion is born of mental effervescence. It is, accordingly, merely an idea or illxision, but as its effects are real it may be said to have reality.
This theory has been set forth with such a wealth of detail and such enthusiasm that it has already won many converts, and even upon those not converted it has made a profound impression. One weighty objection to it is that it assumes totemism as the historical base of all forms of religion; without the totemic power and symbol there [ p. 6 ] would be no starting-point for the collective representation of society as a spiritual power.
But the fundamental objection which will eventually overthrow this theory is that it ignores or minimizes beyond reason the individual in favor of the group. What is true of ritual and even of ethics as. being in general a group-product is here transferred to primitive thought and emotion. Now it is perfectly true that environment in great measure determines religious values that affect the group as a whole and, inclusively, the individual. The cow is holy in India and the Todas have a cult of the buffalo; ’ both animals are of prime importance as a source of food. The food-supply of the Australians comes in large part from animals which the natives hunt and whose prototypes they imagine to be their own ancestors. Most of the religious or magical activities of an Australian clan are connected with the conservation and propagation of these animals. But, as has been remarked by Professor King, in Africa, where food is at hand, without effort, hunting has no religious significance. Environment thus conditions the concerted social activity of a clan and any magical or religious system is primarily the product of its economic and social life. In so far, it is quite correct to say that society (the human group) conditions religion and it is a facile task to point out, for example, that the great religious functions of the Hebrews, state feasts and celebrations, still express an ancient economic status. Without the first-fruits and harvests there would have been no such expression; a religious feast stiU celebrates the ancient vintage.
Yet between religion as a system, conditioned by social economics, and a subjective religious state of mind there is a distinction, which this theory does not ignore but combats by assuming that a man’s mind is wholly the product of his social environment: But while it can be shown that [ p. 7 ] a state-religion is but one aspect of economic life, it by no means follows that the individual’s religious thought and feeling are merely the reflex of group-mentality. Itf is of course true that any one individual’s state of mind is more or less the product of his whole being as conditioned by intercourse with others. What the group seeks the individual seeks; its aim is his; its likes and dislikes are his. Otherwise he soon drops out of the group, perforce.[1] Uniformity is the bond of the group and the individual mind reflects the mind of the group. Yet no group-coercion can utterly stifle the individual, nor is religious emotion on the part of the individual wholly dependent on the group, any more than the savage’s fear of a power sudcfenly apprehended is a product of groupinfluence. Neither social ner economic conditions determine the attitude, and the proof of this lies in the fact that his attitude, expressing fear or hope, is universally found in savage life, whatever be the economic -or social surroundings. Deprecation, a rudimentary religious attitude, is common to most savages in the presence of an awesome object or event.
Hence, while it must be admitted that religious ideas in general reflect a man’s habitat and group, it is a serious error to imagine that the habitat or group in which he is born produces his religious state of mind. The French theory does not hesitate to insist that man does not think at all as an individual; there 'is no such thing as an individual mentalty and consequently all religious thought is social. But it is pure assumption that the mind of the group is so overwhelmingly coercive that the individual mind is entirely subservient to it. All that can be affirmed is that the social atmosphere affects the religious conseiousness. [ p. 8 ] French scholars working more or less with Durkheim and largely inspired by him maintain that “all, religious consciousness is a product of social atmosphere.” They regard the individual as a single cell incapable of thought except as part of the collective consciousness. The group thinks only as a whole, as the 'mob wills as a whole. Mob-mentality is as powerful as mobemotion. The individual not only has no ideas of his own, he is incapable of originating any ideas.’[2]
A different line of approach to the conclusion that “religion is a product of social intercourse” is found by ’ some writers who underestimate religious data as not really religious. Thus it is argued that, when a savage makes obeisance to a dangerous object, this is not in reality a religious act but only “a first step, as a mediating principle, to religion,” the step we make “when we treat a live wire with caution.” Not a happy illustration, because we do not think of placating the wire. Similarly,although it is admitted that the Hurons sacrificed tobacco or fat “as a mark of respect to some deity or deities,” these acts are said to be not religious and “hardly above the level of mere practical expedients.”[3] But if the act of sacrificing to a deity be not a religious act, what is it? To make such a sacrifice is to assume that the object or power to whom sacrifice is made has volition to help or to harm and may be placated. Surely this is the same attitude as is taken by most worshippers in bodies usually called religious.
Yet, although the influence of collective suggestion has been exaggerated in Durkheim ’s theory and the distinction between religion and the “first step” toward religion is imperceptible, it remains a pregnant fact that [ p. 9 ] religion is an organic part of social activity. The idea that the religious consciousness is born of social excitement and intoxication, in which for the first time man conceives of himself as unhuman and of a world different from the normal (for this is the gist of Durkheim’s theory) is not substantiated by the facts, nor is it altogether novel, for it was preceded by the extraordinary theory of Gruppe that religion began when some Syrian first got drunk and being intoxicated imagined himself divine; and, too, the influence of the group ‘has long been recognized; but it is still well to remember that a great part of what is called religion is strictly social. How do laws acquire religious value and validity, as for example in India, where the code is regarded as inspired? Because all law is originally custom, the modus vivendi adopted by the group, and .this again harks back to greater antiquity, which receives religious color from the authority of precedent in that it is imagined a sin to transgress the customs of the fathers, who remain in memory as members of the group still having authority. In matters lacking that authority, sin is what at the present time offends the tribal consciousness of unity. The earliest law-givers in India proclaimed that such and such acts were sinful because they vioihted ancient custom. Thus. they distinguished as “sinful in the north” certain acts which were “not sinful in the south” and promised eternal felicity to those who did not commit the (local) sins enumerated. Not content with this, however, whenever possible they drew upon the example of the gods, as known by report, to enforce their decrees, yet always in the form “so did the gods of old,” laying quite as much stress upon the authority of antiquity as upon divine precedent, as may be seen from the circumstance that it was a matter of indifference whether the formula ran “for so did the gods of old” or “for so did the sages of old.” The religious [ p. 10 ] motive was in both cases identical; sin was contravention of well established custom. So religious and governmental functions were at first undifferentiated, and even in the civilized nations of antiquity as well as among savages today kingship and religious leadership tend to coincide. It is for this reason that in primitive societies morality and law make one whole and that this whole is religious. Thus one can speak only of religious morality and religious law or of the complex, religious moral law. So lites and ceremonies, oiiginally social or economic or both, become religious, and the individual sharing therein may be described as socially religious. Such a pastime as. dancing, such an economic ceremony as the theatrical propagation of crops by masked dancers, are originally social functions which acquire rehgious value.
This common custom of masking oneseK as an animal leads to the consideration of the question whether such primitive mysticism implies in the actor a different sort of mentality from that of civilized man. It has been argued by the French scholars already referred to that primitive man was actually so different from us that he is today incomprehensible. He had a “pre-logicaP’ mind, which appears to mean that he was a mystic. He believed, for example, that he was both a man and an animal, and that he could injure an enemy by injuring an image or knowing and misusing the enemy’s name. But the argument as to being at the same time a man and a wolf presupposes that the savage has a clear conception of man as distinct from wolf; otherwise it would not be illogical to believe that a man might be a wolf. So the Hindu priest at the sac-”ifice becomes unhuman and then formally “becomes a man again” at its conclusion. So, too, piercing an image to make the enemy suffer or operating with a name as if it affected the owner of the name are not illogical acts when one believes that image and name are [ p. 11 ] parts of personality. These and many other instances cited to prove pre-logical mentality in savages are found also among peoples to whom it would he impossible to deny logical mentality. All that one can say is that, the savage takes for granted what has not been proved. But he seeks neither to prove nor disprove; his act logically follows on what he believes. Savages as we know them are by no means illogical. There is therefore no force to the conclusion drawn in this theory that pre-logical coldeetive representation must be irrational and hence all religion, being based thereon, is illusory. All mysticism today is regarded in this theory as inherited from the prelogical state. Yet Durkheim grants religion a certain reality on the ground that no human institution based on error could endure, though what endures is actually nothing more than the expression of social activities. That is to say, collective representations are not fundamentally false, though based on pre-logical mentality, because they express something that existed, namely, the activity and reality of the group, which reality we call religious.[4]
What is really found in the lowest mental states is not lack of logic but inability to distinguish between mind and matter. To early man all substance is the same, neither material nor immaterial. The most primitive savages do not regard the two as separate. All matter is sentient and has mentality; all spirits are analogous to the minds of men, that is, encased in body, or rather indissolubly one vuth the material in which they appear. It is not a distinct spirit in a thing which such savages recognize but, so to speak, a spiritized thing, an dbject imbued with power. [ p. 12 ] The object does not possess a power as something distinct from the body bnt is itself powerful. Each object has a different power, but there is to the savage no one universal power of which the single object expresses a part. Of this false interpretation of mana as a worldpower it vdll be necessary to speak later. At preset it is important to understand that the belief in an undifferentiated whole precedes the belief in spirit as something distinct from body. A study of the objects of worship will help to make this clear.
This is true of animals as well as of men; any disparity or dissimilarity in the individual causes it to be rejected by the group, through an instinctive objection to whatever is opposed to its solidarity. ↩︎
For a criticism of this theory, see Clement C. J. Webb, Group Theories of Religion and the Individual, London, 1916, ↩︎
Irving King, The Development of Religion, N. Y., 1910, pp. 65, 81, 82. ↩︎
Incidentally, Durkheim derives ideas of cause, substance, time, and space also from collective representation originally social and religious and hence illusory. But classification, here represented as beginning by reason of the group, already exists in the very recognition of the group. See Webb, op. cit., pp. 73 f. ↩︎